Book Project - Paternalistic Punishment

In this book, I argue that rather than deploy traditional punishments, which are often significantly harmful, we should instead impose benefits on offenders by behaving paternalistically towards them. I argue that we should do this even if we hold that paternalistic behaviour is impermissible when directed towards innocent persons. The same paternalistic behaviour is permissible when directed towards offenders. I call this paternalistic punishment.

There are many possible paternalistic punishments. They range from the less severe, where we could require the offender to undergo a literacy programme, to the more severe, where we could prevent him from smoking, or compel him to exercise, on the grounds of his health. Whether we should impose any particular punishment depends on our answers to other questions, such as what is good for people, and why should we punish offenders. But the thought is that we could hold a wide range of views on these issues, and still accept that punishment should be all things considered beneficial for the offender, rather than harmful. I argue that even those who believe in harsh punishments should be in favour of paternalistic punishment, for there are many types of paternalistic punishments that could inflict severe harm, while still being all things considered beneficial for the offender.

The idea that we ought to benefit offenders as a response to their wrongdoing has a long tradition, including Plato, Kierkegaard, and Hegel. It also has some contemporary proponents, such as Jean Hampton and Herbert Morris. The book aims to revitalise this tradition, which in recent years has been in decline following powerful sustained criticism.

My argument is very different from these traditional paternalistic theories of punishment. They aim to provide an answer to the question, why should we punish offenders? They answer that the justifying reason to punish offenders is to confer a specific benefit, namely, the benefit of moral improvement. I respond to a different question, namely, how should we punish offenders? The book makes the distinct contribution that, regardless of one’s view of why we should punish, we should (in some cases) impose paternalistic punishment. As a result, my argument is compatible with several theories of punishment, including retributivism, deterrence, and rehabilitation, while also circumventing the objections to paternalistic theories of punishment. This relates to a key advantage of paternalistic punishment. By conferring a benefit to the offender, it can be the least harmful possible punishment that also achieves the aim of our theory of punishment. All other things being equal, it is wrong to cause more harm than less harm. The book also provides some solutions to longstanding problems facing all theories of punishment, particularly as to how the practice of punishment can be reconciled with liberal neutralist and perfectionist views on the role of the state. 

The book substantially revises and expands the argument set out in my paper, Paternalism as Punishment, published in Utilitas (2021).